Appointment vs Election Wake Forest Board: Why It Matters

The appointment vs election Wake Forest board debate has arrived. When Wake Forest Commissioner Ben Clapsaddle won the mayor’s race this November, his victory created a democratic deficit. The new Board of Commissioners is now tasked with appointing someone to fill his just-vacated seat, and the integrity of that choice will define their commitment to representative government.

The debate has already centered on a politically convenient shortcut: appointing the third-place finisher from the November election. The argument seems logical: “They received the next-most votes, so that’s the fairest thing to do.”

But this argument is based on a statistical illusion. Because of the flawed, information-poor electoral system we use, “third place” does not mean “next most preferred.” It simply means “third place.” Appointing the third-place finisher is a guess, not a democratic mandate.

This gap between a simple plurality and the actual will of the people is precisely the problem that Ranked Choice Voting (RCV) is designed to solve. Understanding the appointment vs election Wake Forest board distinction is essential for preserving democratic accountability.

Appointment vs Election Wake Forest Board: What Our “Choose Up to Two” System Hides

In North Carolina, municipal elections often use a “Plurality Bloc Voting” system. In the 2025 commissioner race, voters could “choose up to two” candidates from a field of five. The top two finishers—Haseeb Fatmi and Keith Shackleford—won.

This system is simple, but it is democratically inadequate. It only tells us who voters approved of, not who they preferred.

We have no data on who a Fatmi-only voter would have ranked second, or who Shackleford-only voters would have ranked third. We don’t know the voters’ preference order for the Dement-James slate.

The call to appoint Dement assumes he was the consensus “next choice.” But the data aren’t there. As a hypothetical statistical analysis shows, it is entirely plausible that another candidate, like Nick Sliwinski—who ran on a platform of cross-partisan goodwill—was the actual second- or third-choice for a broader majority of voters, even if he finished last in the plurality count.

Our system leaves us to guess. RCV would have given us the data.

The Solution: How RCV Reveals the Will of the Voters

Ranked Choice Voting captures a voter’s full preference. Instead of just picking two candidates, you rank them in order: 1st choice, 2nd choice, 3rd choice, and so on.

Here’s how RCV (specifically, Instant Runoff Voting) works in a single-winner race, such as a special election to fill this vacancy:

All first-choice votes are counted. If a candidate has a true majority (50% + 1), they win.
If not, the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated.
The ballots for that eliminated candidate are not “wasted.” They instantly transfer to those voters’ second choice.
This “instant runoff” continues until one candidate has a majority mandate.

Had the original multi-seat election used proportional RCV (Single Transferable Vote), we would have a precise record of voter preferences. The Board wouldn’t have to speculate; they could use the election data to guide their appointment with democratic legitimacy.

Yes—North Carolina Tried RCV Before. Here’s Why It Didn’t Last.

North Carolina authorized a limited RCV/IRV pilot in 2006, allowing up to 10 municipalities and 10 counties to opt in, and also permitting IRV to fill specific judicial vacancies. North Carolina General Assembly

Only two localities stepped forward. Cary ran a 2007 pilot but had to hand‑count second and third rankings because county voting machines couldn’t tabulate IRV at the time—delaying results about a week. Even so, exit polling found most voters thought ranking was easy. Hendersonville continued the pilot in 2009. The Assembly NC

The biggest stress test came in 2010, when a 13‑candidate statewide Court of Appeals race used IRV. Counting and retabulation stretched for weeks; after additional preferences were tallied, Doug McCullough edged past first‑round leader Cressie Thigpen, fueling skepticism about the process’s complexity and timing.

By 2013, the General Assembly let the municipal pilot authority lapse and repealed IRV authorization for judicial vacancies as part of a broad elections bill—effectively ending RCV in North Carolina.

Bottom line: the experiment stumbled less because voters rejected ranking and more because of outdated equipment. The opinion of most election experts supports reform, slow tabulation, and shifting political winds. Those are solvable implementation issues—not arguments against majority‑producing elections.

Why RCV Builds Better Local Governance

This isn’t just about filling vacancies. It’s about building a more resilient, representative, and trusting system—a system supported by extensive nonpartisan research.

It Ensures a True Majority Mandate. RCV ensures the winner is not just the most liked, but also the most acceptable to a broad majority. In a polarized climate, a 51% mandate is far more potent than a 35% plurality (Gaffney, 2021).
It Ends the “Spoiler Effect.” RCV eliminates “strategic voting.” You can vote for the candidate you genuinely like (your 1st choice), knowing that if they don’t win, your vote automatically transfers to your second choice. You never “waste” your vote (Burden, 2005).
It Encourages Civil Campaigning. This is its most transformative aspect. To win, a candidate must compete to be the 2nd- and 3rd-choice for their opponents’ supporters. This disincentivizes “scorched-earth” tactics and rewards coalition-builders. Studies of RCV cities confirm this positive impact on campaign tone (Donovan, 2018).
It Makes More Votes Count. In our current system, any vote cast for a losing candidate (like Dement, James, or Sliwinski) is “exhausted.” In RCV, that vote stays in play, working its way up the rankings until it helps elect a winner.

A Clear Path Forward for North Carolina

This is not a radical idea; it is a proven, North Carolina-based solution.

The Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of North Carolina Elections—a cross-partisan group of leaders—issued its final report in 2025. Their top recommendation was for the General Assembly to “authorize RCV for municipal elections on a pilot basis,” noting it would “ensure majority support for elected officials and reduce polarization in local governance” (NCFBE, 2025, p. 5).

Cities across the country—from Minneapolis, MN to Santa Fe, NM—use RCV. Voters in these cities report higher levels of satisfaction and feel their voices “matter more” (Healthy Democracy, 2022).

As our new leaders prepare to fill this vacant seat, the appointment vs election Wake Forest board question demands an answer. Appointing the third-place finisher is a political shortcut based on a statistical fallacy. In a moment when public trust is fragile, we should stop guessing what the voters want and adopt a system that actually asks them.

References

Burden, B. C. (2005). Eliminating the ‘Spoiler Effect’: The Case of Ranked-Choice Voting. University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Donovan, T. (2018). Civility in Ranked-Choice Voting Elections. RCVRC.
Gaffney, M. (2021). Single-Winner Ranked Choice Voting. FairVote.
Healthy Democracy. (2022). RCV in Practice: A Review of Research on the Performance of Ranked Choice Voting.
North Carolinians for Better Elections (NCFBE). (2022). The Final Report of the Blue Ribbon Commission on the Future of North Carolina Elections.

Tom Baker IV

Tom Baker IV is the publisher of Wake Forest Matters, Wake Forest’s only independent local newsroom. A Wake Forest native, Navy veteran, and intelligence professional, Tom launched Wake Forest Matters to bring serious accountability journalism to his hometown. Tips and story ideas: publisher@wakeforestmatters.com